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I.

Introduction: The Legacy Question

Hundreds of gallons of ink that have been spilled over the last three decades trying to
answer the era=s prime political mystery. It came to an end on May 31, 2005. Deep Throat, it
turns out, was Mark Felt, the person who, according to historical consensus, ran the FBI during
the two-year period between the Watergate burglary and Richard Nixon's resignation. This
revelation terminated an entire industry of amateur sleuths and historians. It hit me particularly
close to home.
Bob Woodward's book about his relationship with Mark Felt, The Secret Man: The Story
of Watergate=s Deep Throat,2 answers many of the questions scores of Americans like me have
been pondering since childhood. It also places many pet theories into perspective and causes
many of us to reexamine our beliefs about public service.
Watergate was the defining story of my professional life. When Mark Felt was exposed, I
was in the middle of my second decade with the Department of Justice.
It all started 33 years earlier, when I was nine years old. My father, a business school
professor then involved in industrial seminars around the country, is about the same age as John
Dean, and at the time bore an uncanny resemblance to him. He was frequently accosted by
mistaken well-wishers at airports and hotels on the trips I took with him during the summer
when Dean was testifying on television before the Senate committee investigating the Watergate
abuses. The unfolding scandal was the first time I had heard the word Asubpoena,@ a term that
would be a prominent part of my future lexicon.
A dozen years later, when I was in law school at UCLA, it appeared that another
Republican president would be brought down by a scandal that came to be known as IranContra. By that time, I was clerking at the U.S. Attorney=s Office in Los Angeles, the city
where, as I will explain, the Watergate scandal began. I had started to plan my entry into federal
law enforcement.
Shortly after joining Justice in the fall of 1990, I took it upon myself to read every
Watergate book I could find. I avidly watched the CBS documentary commemorating the 20th
anniversary of the break-in, went to book signings and lectures, and followed with great interest
the various historical theories and the news that accompanied the gradual opening of archives.
Living in Washington, I visited the locations where certain Watergate-related events occurred.
I now know far more trivia about 1970s-era government misdeeds than is good for me.
2

Bob Woodward, The Secret Man: The Story of Watergate=s Deep Throat (Simon &
Schuster 2005) (hereinafter The Secret Man)
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Mark Felt=s exposure as Deep Throat requires people like me to reexamine long-held
beliefs about what it means to be a public servant. This is because Mark Felt was one of my
kind - a career law enforcement officer who presumably survives from year to year irrespective
of which political party happens to be in power. For us, one way of assuring this survival is
strict adherence to the standards of what we proudly call the Acareer professional.@ This means
being loyal to whoever is in charge, respecting the position even if not the persons who occupies
it, not getting too close to either political party, and certainly not jeopardizing sensitive, ongoing
investigations with loose talk. It is something that is seared into our conscience from the day we
take the oath of office. What does the exposure of Mark Felt say about this ethos, and our
legacy?
My current work involves counterterrorism. I have been involved with the USA
PATRIOT Act, and law enforcement efforts to explain to the public, from a careerist
perspective, why it contains tools that are key to our meeting the modern national security
challenge. Several months ago, I published an article in the Texas Review of Law & Politics,
arguing that history is important to those who are arguing about whether we have struck the
proper balance between national security and civil liberties.3
I had modest hopes that the article would be by a rallying cry for fellow lawyers to more
fully read and appreciate modern history, and to incorporate it more generously into their legal
arguments. I argued that history cannot be separated from the practice of law, because it is a
respect for our past - the doctrine of stare decisis B that is the currency of American judicial
decisionmaking. In legal debates over the War on Terror, history must be considered, for if you
claim to be a lawyer, you are bound by the rules of legal reasoning, including the obligation to
understand precedent and either follow it or distinguish it. The examination of national security
and law enforcement history shows that, when the government goes too far, there will be
corrective action. The bad guys masquerading as good guys get exposed, and the good guys
wrongfully accused of being bad guys are rehabilitated. As a society that operates under the rule
of law, we learn from our mistakes. In the United States, tyranny is impossible because the
courts and Congress have never been reluctant to interpose their judgments when faced with
claims that federal law enforcement has gone too far in the name of national security. That is
comforting. At least that is what I thought.
Mark Felt=s exposure threw a wrench into my theory, for I am legitimately confused
about his historical legacy and where he falls on the hero/villain continuum. In my article, I
referred to him by name as an example how the Department of Justice can be trusted to clean
house when they discover misconduct that rises to constitutional proportions. The misconduct I
was referring to, of course, was not leaking information to Bob Woodward. It involved
3
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and Abuses of History,@ 9 Texas Review of Law & Politics 226 (Fall 2004).
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unconstitutional searches of private dwellings. Categorizing Mark Felt, it turns out, is not such
an easy task.
A question is now reverberating: was Mark Felt a good guy? In public lore, he is an
honest G-Man who became disgusted at the Nixon Administration=s unscrupulous exploitation
of law enforcement means to monitor and disrupt people who disagreed with them. The
problem was, after playing the role of Bob Woodward=s famous confidential source, Felt himself
was indicted and convicted of violating the civil rights of members of a domestic terrorist group
and their families. His co-defendant was former FBI Director Patrick Gray, who Felt apparently
resented.
The fact that Felt and Gray were in the dock together is, in retrospect, a rather cruel
irony. People examining Felt=s motives for cooperating with Woodward speculate that he was
gravely disappointed when Gray was chosen as J. Edgar Hoover=s successor. Felt, it seemed,
was a Hoover loyalist, who wanted to continue the founding Director=s legacy. What exactly
was that legacy? Most historians agree that Hoover=s record on civil rights was less than stellar.
He was not afraid to cut corners, to use pernicious means to attack his political enemies like
Martin Luther King, Jr. If Felt=s loyalty to Hoover meant deep distrust of the henchmen in the
Nixon White House, what side of civil liberties was he on?
From there, it gets even weirder. Gray originally got into trouble because of his
involvement in the Watergate cover-up, although he avoided indictment. A few years after
Nixon=s resignation, Jimmy Carter was elected, and Gray was indicted with Felt for civil rights
violations committed while Gray was FBI Director and Felt was his deputy. The fact that
prominent federal law enforcement officials were charged with crimes was hardly
unprecedented. In the preceding years, across the street from FBI Headquarters at Main Justice,
two consecutive Attorneys General - John Mitchell and Richard Kleindist – were both indicted
and convicted of Watergate-related felonies. No shock here. This was the 1970s. Americans
had grown accustomed to it.
Gray managed to get himself severed from the Felt indictment, and charges against him
were eventually dropped. Felt went to trial and was convicted, although he was later pardoned
by President Reagan. In what was truly a strange twist, Gray then turned around and filed a
lawsuit against the Carter Administration and various government officials involved in his
prosecution, arguing that his constitutional rights were violated.
So we have this situation: a President of the United States is driven from office because
of certain steps taken by aides who felt that their intrusive investigative actions were, according
to them, somehow justified by national security and the need to disrupt their political
opposition. As the plot unravels, and federal law enforcement begins to close in on the
conspirators, a senior FBI agent leaks details of the investigation to an enterprising young
reporter. The motive for the leaks is loyalty to the legacy of a former FBI Director, and disgust
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that his beloved Bureau is being manipulated, plus perhaps some disappointment that he had
been passed over for the agency=s top job in favor of an interloper. The leaks result in news
stories, prompting a Congressional investigation. The leaker=s rival at the FBI, the interloper, is
ultimately implicated in the cover-up, though he escapes indictment, and resigns in disgrace.
A few years later, the leaker and the interloper are indicted together, accused of engaging
in the same type of civil rights violations that brought down the President, presumably justified
by their concerns over the threat of political violence. The leaker is convicted, but his rival is
exonerated, only to turn around and sue the various federal law enforcement officials who were
responsible for the prosecution. Keep in mind that all occurred in less than a decade!
What does this portend for those of us in federal law enforcement caught up in renewed
efforts to keep American safe from political violence? If these kinds of unexpected twists are
possible, questions abound. Ten years from now, will the War on Terror be over? Could the
United States be an Islamic fundamentalist country, or led by people who now argue that the
Department of Justice of today is a monolithic and tyrannical? What about careerists who have
no political agenda or ambition? Will we be accused of being enemies of the state if there is a
massive reevaluation of our methods and the investigations and prosecutions we helped develop
in these perilous times? These are not easy answers. Who exactly are the good guys? How can
we be sure, when history changes so quickly?
Bob Woodward=s book does not answer these questions, but it does provide details that
make new assessment about Deep Throat possible. Even without intending to shed light on the
larger issue of counterterrorism, the book provides evidence that should be welcomed by those
lawyers who accept the notion that history is relevant. To fully appreciate it, one needs to
understand what happened in Watergate, and how the case of players – including Mark Felt and
Bob Woodward - reacted to those events.
II.

The Watergate Break-In and Cover-Up

There have been several dozen books written about the Watergate scandal, from a
variety of viewpoints. As a lawyer, I prefer the accounts from the judicial opinions in which the
role of the various players is analyzed for criminal culpability, since facts do not find their way
into casebooks, particularly appellate opinions, unless they are subject to the cauldron of the
adversarial process. The following chronology comes from some of those cases.4
A.

September 1971: The Ellsberg Break-in

4

The best sources are United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) and
United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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In the summer of 1971, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were apoplectic. The
country had seen a spate of politically-inspired bombings. Many of these represent protests
against the American involvement in Vietnam.5
That summer, a Los Angeles-based RAND Corporation analyst named Daniel Ellsberg
and his friend Anthony Russo, leaked a classified, multi-volume history of the American
involvement in Indochina to the New York Times. Infuriated, the White House formed a
"Special Investigations," or "Room 16" unit, to investigate the theft of the Pentagon Papers and
prevent other such security leaks. The unit was overseen by John Ehrlichman, who was the
Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, and operated by two White House staffers, Egil
Krogh and David Young. Ehrlichman approved the hiring of G. Gordon Liddy, a former FBI
agent, and E. Howard Hunt, a former CIA agent, to the unit.6
The main goal of the unit was to obtain information on Ellsberg to allow the CIA to do a
psychological profile on him. Ellsberg=s psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding, had refused an interview by
the FBI, claiming doctor/patient privilege. To gain enough information to do a psychological
profile of Ellsberg, Hunt suggested a "black bag job" (surreptitious entry) into Dr. Fielding=s
medical office, noting that the FBI no longer engaged in such activities. When Young reviewed
the psychological assessment on Ellsberg prepared by the CIA, he determined that it was
superficial and recommended Hunt=s covert operation. Ehrlichman approved, on the condition
that the operation A not [be] traceable back to the White House."7
Hunt had been involved in the CIA=s 1960 Bay of Pigs Operation, and had contacts in
Miami. He traveled there in mid-August 1971 to enlist the assistance of Bernard Barker,
another Bay of Pigs veteran. Hunt told Barker that the operation involved a Atraitor@ who had
been passing information to the Soviet Embassy. Barker recruited two men, Eugenio Martinez
5

According to figures contained in a 1972 Supreme Court brief submitted by the Attorney
General, there were 1,562 bombing incidents B most of which involved Government-related
facilities B in the United States in the first six months of 1971. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 311 n. 12
(1972).
6

Ehrichman at 914.

7

Ehrlichman at 914-915.
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and Felipe de Diego, for the burglary. They met with Hunt and Liddy on September 2, 1971, in
Los Angeles.
The Miamians were told their mission was to enter Dr. Fielding's Beverly Hills office
and photograph Ellsberg’s file. On September 3, 1971, Barker and de Diego, dressed as
deliverymen, delivered a valise containing photographic equipment to Dr. Fielding's office,
enabling them at the same time to unlock the door to facilitate later entry. Later that evening
they and Martinez inexplicably found both the building and Dr. Fielding's office locked. The
Miamians forced their way into the building, broke the lock on the office door, and used a
crowbar on Dr. Fielding's file cabinets. They spilled pills and materials about the office to make
it appear that the break-in was the work of a drug addict. They could not locate Ellsberg=s
records.8
After relating the details of the entry and their lack of success to Hunt, Barker, Martinez,
and de Diego returned to Miami. Hunt and Liddy returned to Washington, where they reported
the failure of the operation to Krogh and Young. Krogh relayed that information to Ehrlichman.
B.

January 1972: The Emergence of Operation Gemstone

G. Gordon Liddy was not yet done. He had been hired to develop plans for gathering
political intelligence and for countering oppositional demonstrations in President Nixon=s
upcoming reelection campaign. Working with Hunt, he developed a plan known as Operation
Gemstone. In two meetings held during January and February 1972, Liddy presented his initial
Gemstone plan and budget to John Mitchell, at that time Attorney General but even then the
functional head of the Nixon re-election effort which ultimately became known as the
Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP). These meetings were attended by Jeb Stuart
Magruder, CREEP=s Deputy Director, and John W. Dean, III, White House Counsel. Liddy’s
initial pitch failed, Mitchell rejecting the plan’s million-dollar budget as too steep.9
By March 30, 1972, Liddy had pared his budget to $250,000. By then, Mitchell had
resigned his duties as Attorney General to become head of CREEP. On that date, in Key
Biscayne, Florida, Magruder obtained Mitchell's approval for Gemstone in a meeting attended
only by Mitchell, Magruder, and Fred LaRue, a close personal friend to Mitchell then serving as
a top campaign aide.10
Magruder, who had once served on Haldeman's staff, was keeping the White House
8

Ehrlichman at 915.

9

Haldeman at 52.

10

Id. at 53.
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informed of campaign developments, including Gemstone plans and operations, by regularly
transmitting documents and information to Gordon Strachan, Haldeman's assistant.
C.

June 17, 1972: The Watergate Break-In

In the early morning hours of June 17, 1972, about five months before the presidential
election, police arrested five men inside the Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices.
The five men - James McCord, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Martinez, Virgilio Gonzalez, and
Frank Sturgis- were carrying electronic equipment, cameras, and large sums of cash. They had
been hired as part of Gemstone, and had been in the DNC offices once before, in late May 1972.
Their mission this time was to fix a defective bugging device, placed during the prior break-in,
on the telephone of DNC chairman Lawrence O=Brien.11
All five gave aliases to the D.C. police. Liddy, who had been monitoring the operation
from a motel across the street from the Watergate, reported the capture to CREEP's highest
officials, then in California. Liddy told them that one of the captured burglars was James
McCord, on CREEP's payroll as chief of security. In an effort to avoid the appearance of any
link between CREEP and the burglars, Mitchell, Mardian, LaRue, and Magruder met and
decided to contact the new Attorney General, Richard Kleindienst, urging him to have McCord
released from jail before the police penetrated his alias. Mardian placed the call but ultimately
sent Liddy to find the Attorney General when Kleindienst could not be reached directly.
Kleindist insisted that the burglars receive no special treatment. If Mitchell wanted to talk to
him about it, Kleindienst told Liddy, Mitchell should contact him directly.12
Mardian, Magruder, and LaRue drafted a press release which denied any CREEP tie to
the break-in. It suggested instead that McCord might have been working for clients of his
private security firm. The fabrication, approved by Haldeman, was issued by CREEP on June
18, 1972 under Mitchell's name and with his approval.13
Meanwhile, White House and CREEP files regarding Gemstone were being destroyed.
Gordon Strachan performed this function at the White House, at the behest of Haldeman. He
destroyed DNC wiretap reports and a memorandum from Haldeman to Magruder urging that
Gemstone targets shift from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern, the emerging Democratic
front-runner. Magruder ordered removal of all Gemstone materials from the files at CREEP and
took them to his home upon his return from California on June 19. A meeting that night was
11

Haldeman at 52.

12

Id. at 53.

13

Id.
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attended by Mitchell, Magruder, LaRue, and. Dean. There, Magruder asked Mitchell what he
should do with the papers. Mitchell suggested that he "have a fire." Magruder obliged,
destroying the Gemstone documents in his home fireplace.14
D.

The Cover-Up Takes Off

The early damage-control efforts took off from there. John Dean=s monitored the
burglary investigation and prosecution to make sure that it did not implicate anyone beyond the
five burglars. He was moderately successful. On September 15, 1972, the grand jury handed up
indictments against the five burglars, plus Hunt and Liddy.15 Unfortunately for the White
House, their plans to keep the burglars silent were frustrated when they began to break under the
pressure of the criminal proceedings. Meanwhile, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the
Washington Post kept the story alive through their reporting.
What Dean and others did during this period eventually led to the March 1, 1974
indictment of seven additional men: Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mardian, Strachan,
CREEP lawyer Kenneth W. Parkinson and White House aide Charles Colson.16 They were
charged and with conspiracy to obstruct justice, to make false statements to a government
agency, and to defraud the United States by corrupting the operation of the CIA, FBI, and

14

Id.

15

Haldeman at 56.

16

By the time of this indictment, the government was represented by lawyers from the Special
Counsel’s Office. The original burglary prosecution was handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the District of Columbia.
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Department of Justice.17 Dean, LaRue and Magruder were not named as defendants because, by
the time of the indictment, they were cooperating with prosecutors. President Nixon was
referred to as an unindicted co-conspirator. (Four months after the cover-up indictment, when
the secret Watergate taping system showed that Nixon was directly involved in the obstruction
of justice, he resigned as President.)
Following the botched Watergate burglary, the conspirators decided to cover higher
involvement by placing all blame on Liddy, who pledged silence – taking one for the team, so
to speak. They agreed to the story that Liddy was off on a frolic of his own, betraying his
position of trust within CREEP while spreading around its money.

17

18 U.S.C. ' 371. The conspiracy charge in the indictment (Count 1) detailed 45 overt
acts allegedly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy by one or more co-conspirators. Count
2 charged all but Mardian with the substantive offense of obstruction of justice. Mitchell was
charged in Counts 3 through 6 with making various false statements one to the FBI, on two
occasions to the grand jury, and once before the Select Committee. Haldeman was charged with
three counts of making false statements before the Select Committee (Counts 7-9), while
Ehrlichman was charged in three counts with lying to the FBI and to the Grand Jury (Counts 1012). Count 13 charged Strachan with making a false statement to the grand jury. Haldeman at
51.
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Dean met with Liddy on June 19, 1972 and received a full briefing on the background
of the break-in.18 Meeting the next day with Mardian and LaRue, Liddy told them the full story
concerning the background of the break-in, confessed his own role in the planning and
execution, and explained that all those arrested would remain silent. Liddy claimed that certain
"commitments" had been made to provide them with bail, legal fees, and living expenses.
LaRue assured him that all commitments would be met. Later LaRue and Mardian met with
Mitchell, Dean, and Magruder to tell them of Liddy's revelations and to decide how to raise the
funds. Mardian suggested that the CIA might be a source. After all, the burglars had CIA
connections.19
Dean then briefed Ehrlichman, detailing the roles of Hunt and Liddy and mentioning
Liddy=s pledge to remain silent. Ehrlichman issued, then retracted, an order that Hunt leave the
country. He also directed that Hunt's safe, in his office in the Executive Office Building, be
opened. Dean retrieved the materials from Hunt=s safe, including some electronic equipment
related to Watergate along with documents related to other questionable activities. Ehrlichman
suggested to Dean that he shred some and "deep six" the rest. Dean refused, fearing that too
many White House employees and Secret Service agents knew he had removed materials from
the safe. He ultimately turned the items over to the FBI, although the most sensitive went
directly to L. Patrick Gray, the Acting Director, with directions from Dean and Ehrlichman that
they should never see the light of day. Gray obliged.20
With the approval of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, on June 28, 1972 Dean contacted
Herbert Kalmbach, a long-time Nixon fund-raiser, telling him that funds were needed to meet
certain CREEP commitments to the burglars, and that absolute secrecy was essential.
Kalmbach obtained money from LaRue from excess cash held at the CREEP offices, from the
chairman of the CREEP=s Finance Committee and from a private contributor. Before he
approached the private contributor, however, he checked with Ehrlichman to be sure that Dean
was authorized to put this fund-raising in motion. If the operation did not remain secret,
Ehrlichman warned, "they would have our heads in their laps."21
To distribute the money, Kalmbach, a private attorney, found himself doing some
unsavory things. He employed a courier who devised a scheme of leaving the funds in pay
telephone booths and airport lockers. He was responsible for delivering $187,000 to the
18

Haldeman at 53.

19

Id. at 55.

20

Id. at 54.

21

Id. at 56.
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burglars through Hunt's lawyer, Hunt's wife, Hunt himself, and Liddy. All this took place
between July 1 and mid-September, 1972 when Kalmbach made his final accounting and quit.
Dean and LaRue kept Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell posted throughout on the "money
problem."22
The conspirators were able to stall the FBI's tracing of the burglar=s money for about
two weeks by invoking the danger of trespassing on secret CIA projects. The FBI had already
traced the funds to two individuals who apparently served as CREEP intermediaries in the
"laundering" of certain contributions from former Democratic Party supporters. One of the
intermediaries was a Mexican citizen. The FBI was ready to interview these individuals, but
was deterred when General Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA, told Gray on June 23, 1972
that such interviews might uncover CIA operations in Mexico. Walters was acting on direct
orders from Haldeman, communicated by Ehrlichman. Haldeman, in turn, had acted only after
receiving approval for this course from President Nixon in a key meeting earlier that same day,
June 23. He had told Nixon that both Dean and Mitchell suggested use of the CIA to contain
the FBI investigation. (It was the public disclosure of this tape, now commonly referred to as
“the smoking gun tape,” that led to the resignation of President Nixon.)
By July 5, 1972, Gray was getting nervous. He informed Walters that the FBI would
proceed with the interviews unless the CIA directed otherwise, in writing. Walters delivered
instead a memorandum stating that the CIA had no interest in the matter. The interviews
proceeded, although they had been successfully delayed.
This delay was made possible because some of the conspirators were carefully
monitoring the FBI investigation. Beginning on June 21, at Ehrlichman's direction, Dean
established a liaison with the FBI. He sat in on several FBI interviews, received copies of
reports and "lead sheets," and finally obtained a memorandum summarizing the investigation
and future FBI plans. Dean showed this memorandum to Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman.
Like Gray, E. Howard Hunt was getting spooked. He knew that Gemstone had been
approved at the highest levels, and he had been involved in the Ellsberg matter. Unlike Liddy,
he was not willing to fall on his sword and remain silent. He would do so only if he got paid.23
How to explain the cash found on the burglars? Blame Liddy. Magruder first
suggested that CREEP officials simply say that the $199,000 had gone to Liddy for security at
the Republican nominating convention. He rehearsed this scenario at a meeting attended by
Mitchell, Mardian, LaRue, and Dean. Mardian was skeptical because of the large amount.
22

Id.

23

Haldeman at 54.
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Magruder offered an alternative false story: that $100,000 was delivered to Liddy for protection
of "surrogate speakers" as they traveled around the country on behalf of the Nixon campaign.
Only the remainder was meant for convention security. This story would work, particularly
because the CREEP official in charge of the surrogate program would corroborate the story
with perjured testimony of his own.24
Magruder reviewed the false story with Mitchell, who urged him to minimize Mitchell's
role in running the campaign. Magruder then rehearsed it with Dean, in preparation for his
August 16, 1972 appearance before the grand jury. According to Dean=s sources, Magruder=s
testimony allowed him to escape a perjury indictment "by the skin of his teeth.@ Thereafter,
Magruder was recalled before the grand jury in September to explain the January and February
1972 Gemstone meetings that were entered in his calendar. With the assistance of Mitchell and
Dean, he had prepared a subsidiary cover story to hide the purposes of these meetings.
Meanwhile, Mitchell and Ehrlichman denied to FBI agents that he knew anything about the
break-in except what he read in the newspapers. On September 14, 1972 Mitchell falsely told
the grand jury that he was not aware of any clandestine CREEP intelligence program, nor did
he know of Liddy's illegal activities. The next day, the grand jury handed up indictments
against the five burglars, plus Hunt and Liddy. It appeared the the cover-up had worked. Dean
was congratulated. However, the burglar=s financial demands continued.25
E.

The Blackmail Continues

LaRue inherited Kalmbach's role, delivering $20,000 to Hunt's lawyer immediately. On
November 13, a few days after Nixon's landslide defeat of George McGovern, Hunt called
Charles Colson at his White House office, complaining that commitments had not been met,
and he reminded Colson that loyalty "is a two-way street." Colson taped the full conversation.
John Dean made a copy of the tape and took it to Camp David to play it for Haldeman and
Ehrlichman. They agreed that the money was Mitchell's responsibility and dispatched the Hunt
tape to New York in the possession of Dean, to play for Mitchell.26
Mitchell inquired into the availability of a secret $350,000 fund under Haldeman's
control, transferred to the White House from excess CREEP funds. Haldeman approved use of
24

Haldeman at 55.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 56.
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it to meet the burglars' demands. By February 1973, LaRue had dispensed $167,000.
Hunt had decided to plead guilty and wanted a guarantee that his sentence would be
short. Colson checked with the President and then provided some veiled assurances which
Hunt took to mean he would be granted clemency at Christmas 1973.27 Hunt and four of the
burglars pleaded guilty. Liddy and McCord insisted on going to trial, in January 1973, although
neither took the stand. They were found guilty, and sentencing was set for March 23, 1973.28
When McCord began to get restless as his sentencing approached, Mitchell urged that
the same veiled assurances of clemency be extended to him. Ehrlichman agreed, and assurances
were delivered to McCord. They failed to calm him.29
By this time, the conspirators began to worry about the prospect of hearings before the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, chaired by Senator Ervin. Dean,
Haldeman, and Ehrlichman met at Rancho LaCosta in California in mid-February to plot
strategy. They worried most about what the burglars might say before the Committee if granted
immunity. They sent a Presidential assistant to New York, in hopes of getting Mitchell to
cough up more funds for hush money.
On March 16, 1973, Hunt demanded $122,000 to fix his financial affairs before his
sentencing. By this point, Dean knew that he had to tell President Nixon about what was going
on. On March 23, 1973, Dean famously told Nixon that Athere was a cancer growing on the
Presidency@ in the form of seemingly endless demands for money to keep the White House
separated from the Watergate burglary. Dean estimated the future demands would total about
$1 million. Nixon replied, "You could get a million dollars. And you could get it in cash. I, I
know where it could be gotten." 30
The next day, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean agreed that Mitchell should step
forward and take the full blame, thinking the prosecutors and the Senate Committee would
thereby be pacified with the scalp of the former Attorney General and would press no further.
At Mitchell=s request, LaRue then delivered $75,000 to Hunt. On March 22, Mitchell came to
Washington and told the others that the Hunt problem was under control. Despite the previous
day's plans, no one had the fortitude to suggest directly to Mitchell that he take the full blame
and go to jail to save the Nixon presidency. They decided instead that Dean would generate a
27

Haldeman at 57.

28

See United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 509 F.2d 428 (1974).

29

Haldeman at 57.

30

Id.
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report to the President. It would be intentionally general and would indicate that no one from
the White House was involved. They would deliver it to the Senate Committee, and it would
serve as a safeguard for Nixon. If "some corner of this thing comes unstuck," according to
Ehrlichman, Nixon could say he relied on the report.31
Dean was nervous. He hired a lawyer and began meeting with prosecutors. He was
ultimately fired by Nixon, who on that same day reluctantly Aaccepted@ the resignation of
Haldeman and Ehrlichman. In the summer of 1973, Dean appeared before the Senate Select
Committee on Watergate, and detailed the cover-up and Nixon=s role in it. His testimony, of
course, was contradicted by that of Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and the White House
issued defiant denials.
Unknown to everyone at the time was that Nixon had been secretly recording his Oval
Office meetings, and audio tapes existed that would determine who was lying. Between the
exposure of the taping system and the release of recordings that inculpated Nixon in the
Watergate cover-up (and that showed Dean to be telling the truth), the White House
aggressively litigated its right to refuse to produce the tapes, and tried to stop the investigation
by firing special prosecutor Archibald Cox. The public reaction forced Nixon to agree to name
his replacement, Leon Jaworski, who picked up where Cox left off, eventually forcing Nixon=s
hand in a unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court.32 The tapes had to be produced. Nixon=s
fate was sealed. He resigned on August 8, 1974.
The above account is derived from court opinions that do not mention the role of the
Washington Post in bringing the Watergate scandal to a head. While historians argue whether
McCord and Hunt would have become unglued even with the investigative efforts of
Woodward and Bernstein, there is little debate over whether the Post=s coverage kept the story
alive and influenced the decision to hold Congressional hearings. If the story would not have
been possible without Deep Throat, as they now claim, we can conclude that Mark Felt - the
man who essentially ran the FBI for a few years after Hoover=s death - played an instrumental
role in bringing down Richard Nixon. Why did he do it?
III.

Woodward==s Secret Man

One of the more useful features of Woodward=s book is that it includes references to
what Mark Felt himself wrote in his memoirs, The FBI Pyramid.33 This is important, because
31

Haldeman at 58.

32

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974).

33

W. Mark Felt, The FBI Pyramid (Putnam, 1979).
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Felt=s book is long out-of-print and difficult to find today, even in libraries. From Woodward,
we now have a better sense of what motivated Felt, because we now know more about what he
was saying at the time and can compare it to what Felt wrote not long thereafter. The
fascinating thing is that Woodward=s account suggests some motivational conclusions different
from those offered by Woodward himself, when considered in tandem with the court opinions
that describe Felt=s own legal troubles. Some additional twists emerge.
A.

What Felt Did

First, it is important to examine what Felt did. Now unencumbered by the need to
disguise Deep Throat=s identity, Woodward offers more detail about the help the secret source
provided during the pivotal moments of the investigation.
On September 15, 1972, it appeared that the cover-up had worked, and John Dean at the
White House was congratulated on a job well done. The grand jury had handed up an
indictment of the five burglars and Hunt and Liddy. No one in the White House or CREEP had
been publicly implicated in the break-in. Woodward and Bernstein were convinced the plot
went higher. They were crestfallen, but not ready to throw in the towel. Woodward called Felt
and described the reporter=s plan to publish a story that high officials in the Nixon campaign
had been involved in the funding of the burglary.
AToo soft,@ Felt replied, A@You can go much stronger.@34
Felt knew about the money allocated for the larger Gemstone operation, and the
payments from the secret fund to Magruder and campaign aide Bart Porter. Although he did
not give much detail to Woodward that day, he said ALet=s just day I=ll be willing to put the
blossoming situation in perspective for you when the time comes,@ and told him (though not in
so many words), to Afollow the money.@ 35
A few weeks later, Felt delivered on his commitment. As Woodward describes it, Felt
34

The Secret Man at 69.

35

Id. at 69-70. One of the myths of Watergate was that Deep Throat (Mark Felt)
counseled Bob Woodward to Afollow the money.@ This expression was included in the movie,
AAll the President=s Men,@ but, according to Woodward, based on a review of his notes, was
probably never uttered by Felt, at least not in those exact words. Id. at 71.
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was having a particularly bad week in early October 1972, dealing with White House attempts
to obstruct and thwart the growing FBI investigation into the financing of the Watergate breakin. He was disgusted that his new boss, Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray, had acquiesced in
John Dean=s demands and had turned over copies of FBI interview summaries - referred to as
FD 302s - to one of the ostensible co-conspirators. Woodward, who did not know this at the
time, made an appointment with Felt. The FBI agent was waiting at the designated garage,
smoking a cigarette.
There is a way to untie the Watergate knot. I can=t and I won=t give you any names, but
everything points in the direction of what was called AOffensive Security.@ Remember,
you don=t do those 1,500 interviews and not have something in our hands other than a
single break-in. Mitchell was involved.36
Felt was referring to the thoroughness of the FBI=s investigation. He detailed how
Ehrlichman had ordered Hunt to leave town. He described how there were 50 people in the
White House assigned to spy and sabotage the political opposition, and operations in Illinois,
New York, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, California, Texas, Florida and D.C.
AYou could write stories from now until Christmas or well beyond that. Just remember
what I=m saying. Everything was part of it ... I know what I=m talking about.@
Then Felt said something that was significant to Woodward, even at the time:
AIt=s all in the files. Justice and the Bureau know about it, even if it wasn=t followedup.@
Here, Felt was confirming his own source: undisclosed information in law enforcement
sensitive files, which every agent and prosecutor is taught are sacrosanct.37
It is one thing to give information on background. It is quite another to confirm specific
facts contained in law enforcement files. In judging the legality of Felt=s actions, not to
mention the ethics of his choice, this represented a crossing of the Rubicon. It was a bold,
irreversible step.

36

Id. at 75-76.

37

Id. at 75-78.
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B.

Why Felt Did It: Some Theories

Woodward=s is known for his highly detailed factual narratives. In The Secret Man, he
goes beyond the narrative style to offer his own ideas on Deep Throat’s motivation. What is
Bob Woodward=s theory for why Felt did it? He did not consider this question much before
Watergate played out:
It was only after Nixon resigned that I began to swim up that stream seriously.
Why had Felt talked when it carried substantial risks for himself and for the
institution of the FBI? Had he been exposed early on, Felt would have been no
hero. Technically, it was illegal to talk about grand jury information or FBI
files; or it could have been made to look illegal. In retrospect, Felt had believed
he was protecting the Bureau by finding a way, clandestine as it was, to push
some of the information from the FBI interviews and files out to the public, to
help build public and political pressure to make the president and his men
answerable. The FBI findings that Watergate had many tentacles has been
ignored and buried.38
This characterization is undoubtedly true, but only goes so far. If one believes that a
decorated, 30-year veteran FBI veteran would be motivated to protect the institution that
employs him (hardly a novel idea), one can easily attribute all of Felt’s professional actions to
that motive. Wherever you work, you are expected to act in your employer=s interests. Saying
that Felt=s actions as Deep Throat resulted from his loyalty to the FBI stating the obvious, like
saying a cat eats because she is hungry. Government agencies are filled with loyalists, yet few
choose to publicly disclose sensitive information to reporters, even if it would have the impact
of making themselves or their agencies look good. The secondary question is far more elusive:
what was it about Felt=s make-up that led to his decision to cooperate with the scrambling
Washington Post reporters, at that moment in history?
Woodward tackles this one as well, and offers some theories that come close to the
public commentary that followed Felt=s recent exposure.
$

Felt was contemptuous of the efforts to manipulate the FBI for political
reasons;39

$

Felt became disgruntled with the Administration when he got passed over for
the directorship of the FBI in favor of Patrick L. Gray, and was motivated by

38

Id. at 104.

39

Id. at 105.
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personal pique;40 and
Felt liked the game, and it was merely a covert operation he was running
through Woodward.41

$

To these three, I would add a fourth, something that is suggested by some of the new
details Woodward provides, and which is by far the most charitable towards Felt=s legacy: that
he was a civil libertarian who was rightly shocked by the Nixon Administration=s attempts to
trample on the rights of dissidents and political enemies. Under this theory, his outrage was
prescient and ultimately affirmed by history. He was a hero.
Rarely do the motives of historical figures fit so easily into such clear-cut categories,
and the notion that Felt=s decision to become Deep Throat was driven solely by any one of
these to the exclusion of the others would be naive. In reality, historical figures are rarely all
good or all bad. Individuals – especially successful public officials - are conflicted, always a
combination of their best and worse attributes. This is not to say that we should not debate
such issues as an individual legacy in Felt’s case. These debates are healthy and represent an
application of history to what public servants should aspire to today.
Where Mark Felt falls on the good guy/bad guy continuum can only be answered by
considering a number of theories and the circumstances that support the notion that there was a
single force that motivated him (something we acknowledge is impossible in reality). We can
gain insight by marshaling and considering the factual support for each theory. My nominee
theories correspond to those Woodward raised in The Secret Man, plus the one I mentioned.
They are, in order of how negative the implication of them are for Felt=s legacy, as (1) the
gamesman, (2) the disgruntled bureaucrat, (3) the apolitical cop, (4) the civil libertarian.
1.

The Gamesman

This explanation is probably the worst for those arguing that Felt was one of the good
guys. Although it might not more negative than the Adisgruntled bureaucrat@ theory, it probably
gets the nod because it is so nihilistic. After all, who would leak classified and law
enforcement information that brings down a Presidency just for kicks? Who would go through
such cloak-and-dagger steps such as meeting in underground parking garages, throwing a
country into a Constitutional crisis, merely to avoid boredom? Here is how Woodward
describes the Agamesman@ theory of Felt=s actions:
40

Id. at 106.
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Id.

-19-

_____________________
Who Are The Good Guys?
J. Breinholt Aug. 2005

[Perhaps] Felt liked the game. His first real Bureau expertise was as a World
War II spy hunter. Converting all that knowledge and tradecraft to become an
agent runner was perhaps natural. I suspect that in his mind I was his agent. He
beat it into my head: secrecy at all cost, no loose talk, no talk about him at all,
no indication to anyone that such a secret source exists.42
Woodward describes how, in All the President=s Men, he and Bernstein had speculated
on Deep Throat=s piecemeal approach to providing information to them. They thought that, by
raising the stakes gradually, he was simply making the game more interesting for himself.
They ultimately rejected this as a primary motivator, in part because it would be so nihilistic as
to be unfathomable. They doubted someone in Felt=s position would be so cavalier towards
matters affecting Richard Nixon and the American Presidency itself. Felt=s insistence that his
cooperation be done in his way could not have been motivated by such glandular reasons, lest
he be a sociopath. This assessment is logical. Few of Felt=s even harshest critics advance the
gamesman theory.
2.

The Disgruntled Bureaucrat

If Felt were motivated purely by personal pique, it would not speak well of his legacy.
Few people have the luxury of being able to take out their frustrations on a sitting President
who refused to give them a promotion. We like to think that whistleblowers are motivated by
more than just a desire simply to get even. Some support for the disgruntled bureaucrat theory
comes the words in Felt=s own book, The FBI Pyramid, as excerpted by Woodward:

42

Id.
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It did not cross my mind that the President would appoint an outsider to replace
Hoover ... My own record was good and I allowed myself to think I had an
excellent chance... I was resentful that an outsider was taking over, yet at the
same time I was impressed with the strength and sincerity of this man [Gray].@43
This quote (with the exception of the last clause) may explain part of the reason Felt
began cooperating with Woodward. The truth of the last clause is questionable, and the words
might be attributable to Felt=s attempt to be kind to Gray, particularly since his graciousness
towards Gray is belied by how he depicted him to Woodward. In reality, Felt desperately
wanted to succeed J. Edgar Hoover, and was crushed when Gray was chosen. His resentment
simmered as Gray proceeded to mishandle the FBI=s proper role in the Watergate investigation.
For example, Felt told Woodward that Gray had pressured the White House to name
him to the post.44 He also said he lost respect for Gray over the handling of a document in a
growing scandal arising out of an antitrust matte. The White House asked the FBI to examine
for authenticity and then tried to bury it when the results were inconvenient.45
The Adisgruntled bureaucrat@ theory might also explain the Felt=s role (and apparent
glee) in pushing Gray out of the FBI. Woodward recounts how, on April 26, 1973, Woodward
uncharacteristically received a call from Felt while at his desk at the Washington Post.
AGive me a number to call you on,@ Felt said.
Woodward gave him the number of his direct line. Felt called a few minutes later
AYou=ve heard the Gray story? Well, it=s true.@

43
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Id. at 38.
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Felt was referring to the revelation that, in a meeting with Dean and Ehlrichman, Gray
was told that the files taken out of E. Howard Hunt=s safe after the burglary were Apolitical
dynamite@ that Acould do more damage to the White House than the Watergate bugging.@ Gray
took the files to his home in Connecticut and burned them with the Christmas trash in
December 1972. The acting director of the FBI had destroyed evidence. He was history.
Woodward described how he could hear a certain joy in Felt=s voice over the phone. Felt
reportedly spent that afternoon having his secretary compile his biographical information and
photographs for what he thought would be his appointment as FBI Director.46 He was once
again deflated when the White House chose William Ruckelshaus instead. In his own book,
Felt=s described Ruckelshaus= arrival at the FBI as Ablue Monday.@A few weeks later,
Woodward arranged to see Felt, once again in the underground garage. As Woodward
describes it:
I expected to see him happy that Watergate was unraveling. But I also knew
that he would be distressed that he had not been appointed, even temporarily, to
take Gray=s place. That was probably Mark Felt=s last shot.
The mid-May meeting took place in that context. It was the strangest and most
alarming meeting. Felt was nervous, his jaw quivered. He raced through a
series of statements and it was clear that a transformation had taken place.
At that meeting, Felt told Woodward that he would be resigning from the FBI the following
month.47
3.

The Apolitical Cop

This theory is not mutually exclusive with that of the Adisgruntled bureaucrat,@ and is
the one most often advanced by Felt=s supporters. They argue that Felt may have been
disgruntled, not because his personal ambition had been thwarted but because he so respected
the FBI=s tradition of not getting involved in partisan politics. His role as Deep Throat was
motivated by his desire to find an alternative way for the results of the FBI=s thorough
investigation of the Watergate horrors to matter, at a time when it looked like there would
otherwise be a whitewash. By doing what he did, he was protecting his troops, people who
worked so hard on the lines and, but for his courage, would never see the fruits of their labors.
To those who work in hierarchal organizations like law enforcement or the military, this motive
would have been laudable.
46
47

Id. at 96-97.
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Some of Woodward=s descriptions support this theory. He notes that, in Felt=s book, the
former agent angrily denounces the effort to assert political control of the FBI through what he
called a AWhite House-Justice Department cabal.@48 According to Woodward, although Felt=s
fear of FBI politicization surfaced directly in their discussions, AThe threat to the integrity and
independence of the Bureau was real and uppermost in his mind.@49 He also describes a war
story Felt tells in the FBI Pyramid which, even if seen through the lens of a statement likely to
be self-serving, at least shows what Felt wants to portray as an important part of the FBI ethos.
The story involves a dispute he had with Gray over whether to accede to the CIA=s request (at
Nixon=s instruction) not to pursue an interview with the person who wrote $89,000 in checks
deposited into the bank account of one of the Watergate burglars. According to Felt=s account,
he told Gray:
Look, the reputation of the FBI is at stake .... We can=t delay the Ogarrio
interview any longer! I hate to make this sound like an ultimatum, but unless
we get the request in writing from [CIA Director Richard] Helms to forego the
Ogarrio interview, we=re going ahead anyway!@50
One of the problems with the Aapolitical cop@ theory is that the notion of the
independent FBI was neither firmly established nor consistent with the agency’s history, at the
time Felt was choosing his actions. Felt revered J. Edgar Hoover (a point addressed below).
He would have known what we now know: that Hoover was not particularly reluctant to
provide derogatory information to Presidents about their political enemies, in order to curry
their favor. Presidential attempts to politicize the FBI did not begin with Nixon, although
Watergate certainly led to a clean break with that tendency. Presidents today know not to ask
the FBI to do political favors for them, but that is a Watergate=s legacy. Consider how the
public reacted when it was disclosed that the Clinton Administration had requested and
received the FBI files of employees of the White House travel office who they wanted to
replace. Felt’s actions as Deep Throat, however, occurred thirty years ago. It may be too much
to believe that Felt adopted this ethos before anyone else did, and was willing to risk his career
for it to boot.
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There is, however, no question that the FBI as an organization, and Felt as an individual
within it, was motivated by microeconomic principles, such as the notion of incentive. People
are motivated by rewards, which includes recognition for tasks well done. Within the FBI,
there were hackles raised at the prospect that the agency’s excellent spade work in uncovering
the various Watergate tentacles would go unnoticed. Woodward, for example, described a
1975 internal FBI memorandum which complained that the Washington Post was getting too
much credit for the FBI=s investigation, and suggested that some of the investigative yield be
disclosed to dispel the notion that Woodward and Bernstein solved the Watergate case.51
The “apolitical cop” theory is an important one for people like me, when it comes to
judging Felt’s historical legacy. If his actions were explained by this motivation, Felt would
have embodied some of the best traits of career law enforcement. If you are a cop or
prosecutor, your official actions are supposed to be independent of the vagaries of the political
winds. We are trained to be above and separate from partisan politics, and to be blind to the
temptation of advancement by getting too close to elected officials. We are, after all
occasionally required to ruffle feathers, and go after people in power, and public confidence in
us would be jeopardized if it appeared that we were compromised by power. In the ideal
world, there is a system that protects us. The same system turns on us if we were to look the
other way at crimes or abuses being committed by the political class, even when the abusers are
in a position of authority over us. The problem for this theory is that this type of ethos was not
well-established at the time, nor practiced by the FBI Director who Felt revered.
4.

The Civil Libertarian

Of the four theories, this is the one that speaks the most favorably about Felt. The Acivil
libertarian@ theory holds that Felt was motivated by his respect for the constitutional rights of
those whom the Nixon Administration was targeting during this era. This is the theory Felt=s
strongest supporters would like to see accepted.
This theory finds some support in Woodward=s book. In July 1973, a month after his
retirement and before Nixon=s resignation, Felt told Woodward over the phone. AThe problem
was that we wouldn=t burglarize.@52 Woodward describes how Felt stopped efforts by the FBI to
Aidentify every member of a hippie commune in Los Angeles,@ reasoning that Aonly a small
number of members had actually advocated or participated in violence and there was no
justification for investigating others.@53 In The FBI Pyramid, Felt boasts that J. Edgar Hoover
51
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was the only senior officials after Pearl Harbor to oppose Japanese-American internment.54
This theory suffers, however, from two inconveniences that make it almost as much of a
stretch as the Agamesman@ theory on the opposite end of the continuum. First, Felt was, by all
accounts, a Hoover loyalist, very much like the FBI agents I have known who were Hoover
hires. (Today, there are only a handful left in the FBI.) Felt’s hero was no poster child for
concern over the constitutional rights of political dissidents.
There is, however, an even deeper problem with the Acivil libertarian@ theory. Felt=s
actions at the FBI - for which he was ultimately indicted - showed that he did not fear taking
supra-constitutional action when expediency demanded it. This is not to say that Felt was
wrong and his Department of Justice accusers were right to seek criminal charges against him.
Felt may have been somewhat justified in thinking that right that his actions were necessitated
by the climate of the time. However, he cannot claim to have become Deep Throat because he
was shocked by what the Nixon White was doing against dissidents. The more likely story is
that the FBI objected to the White House=s aggressive surveillance plans because it did not
want competition. After all, Woodward says Felt has over about John Ehrlichman=s Senate
testimony about the Ellsberg break-in. At the same time, Felt adamantly defended the
government=s scrutiny of Ellsberg.55 Clearly, Felt was not angry over what Ehlrichman, Hunt
and Liddy did with the Miami Cubans in Los Angeles. He was mad because they were doing it
without the help of the FBI.
IV.

The Tangled Webs

What makes The Secret Man a remarkable historical document is not merely the
additional detail Woodward provides about his dealings with Felt around the time the Nixon
Administration was sinking, much of which had been published before the disclosure of Felt=s
identity. Rather, it is Woodward=s account of how Felt reacted when Watergate ended and he
found himself being chased by hard-nosed investigators. What does this reaction say about his
motives? We can learn about Felt=s troubles from the judicial opinions that tell the story.
Woodward=s book reveals actions and statements by Felt that shed light on his state of mind at
the time. Together, several more bizarre historical twists emerge, along with a fifth theory for
Felt=s motivation.
A.

The Trial of Mark Felt

In April 1976, approximately two years after Felt resigned from the FBI, the Justice
54
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Department commenced an investigation into the FBI's use of illegal break-ins against family
members and friends of several members of a radical Vietnam Era organization known as the
Weather Underground.
Jimmy Carter, a Democratic President, was elected seven months later, and took office
in January 1977. In April 1978, a Grand Jury sitting in Washington, D.C., handed up a onecount indictment charging L. Patrick Gray, Mark Felt and another FBI official, Edward S.
Miller, with conspiring to deprive certain relatives and acquaintances of Weather Underground
fugitives of their rights, in violation of one of the criminal civil rights statutes.56 The legal
theory of this prosecution had been established in the prosecution of Ehrlichman for the
Ellsberg/Fielding break-in.57 It was a creative charging decision. Prior to that time, this
particular statute had been used mainly to prosecute racial hate crimes.58
On March 5, 1979, District Court Judge William Benson Bryant severed Gray's case
from the trial of Felt and Miller. In August 1980, shortly before commencement of the trial of
Felt and Miller, Gray moved to dismiss the indictment against him outright, claiming
prosecutorial misconduct in the failure to present the grand jury with the full evidence. The
prosecutors acknowledged weaknesses in the case against Gray and in the manner in which it
was presented to the grand jury, but indicated that they expected the trial of Felt and Miller to
reveal testimony substantiating the charges against Gray. Without that testimony, prosecutors
conceded, further proceedings against Gray would be unwarranted. The court accepted the
prosecutors argument, and denied the dismissal.

56
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Felt and Miller went to trial, and they were convicted on November 6, 1980. Because
the trial failed to bring out evidence strengthening the Government's case against Gray,
prosecutors filed a nolle prosequi on December 10, 1980, acknowledging that the charges
against Gray were "unconvincing,@ voluntarily dismissing the indictment against him.59 Felt
and Miller were ultimately granted full and unconditional pardons by President Reagan.
B.

What Was He Thinking?

Thanks to Bob Woodward, we now know how Felt reacted to his legal troubles.
In June 1974, Felt was visited at home by two FBI agents, who insisted that he
accompany them to the local Holiday Inn and sign a form acknowledging his understanding of
his Constitutional rights. They asked him questions involving a Watergate-related leak to the
New York Times. As Woodward describes it:
Felt denied any involvement. The drip, drip, drip of inquiry and the
investigative zeal of the era were coming home to roost, and Felt didn=t like it
one bit. Though I didn=t know it at the time, Felt was carrying around a secret
that was perhaps as big or bigger than his role as Deep Throat.60
Over the next years, Felt was called to testify five times before the Senate committee
investigating civil rights abuses by the U.S. intelligence community. In his retirement, he had
essentially become a professional witness. At some point, his status would change to that of an
investigative target. He had been present at too many meetings that were of interest to
prosecutors. It was just a matter of time.

59
60

Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The Secret Man at 117-118.
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The first stories regarding the Justice Department civil rights investigation into the
FBI=s conduct against the Weather Underground arose in the summer of 1976. Woodward
describes this investigation as a natural result of the post-Watergate climate, in which the
American public was eager to see civil rights abuses of Nixon critics redressed.61 In fact,
Woodward himself jumped into the fray, writing an article which quoted Mark Felt, by name,
as saying:
I=m proud of what I did ... You=ve got to remember that we were dealing with
murderers, terrorists, people who were responsible for mass destruction ... The
key word is violence. They were planning mass destruction ... Please emphasize
the viciousness of these people. We were dealing with fanatics.
If you learn in advance of a bomb about to go off, you can’t put your fingers in
your ears and wait for it to go off ... [T]hese people had claimed responsibility
for hundreds of bombings and we wanted to put them out of circulation ... we
have an obligation to.
I think I have observed the spirit and the letter of the Constitution ... the right of
one person cannot be allowed to exist to the detriment of the hundreds.62
Felt=s autobiography echoes this defiance. The FBI Pyramid, begins with a description
of the Weather Underground, and how the country was in a Acivil war@ which few people
understood.@ His book quotes Thomas Jefferson, arguing that the Alaws of necessity, or selfpreservation, of saving our country when it is in danger, are of higher obligation . To lose our
country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law would be to lose the law itself.@63
Shortly after Felt=s indictment, Woodward called him at home. Woodward thought he
sounded tired, with the hesitation in his voice of a retiree facing up to 10 years in jail.
Woodward=s attempts to console him and to offer apologies were met with an icy response.
The party was over. Woodward decided not to attend the arraignment, fearing that Felt might
lash out at him.64
In the fall of 1980, the trial opened at the federal courthouse in Washington, before a
jury of eight women and four men. Several weeks into it, on October 29, 1980, there occurred
61

Id. at 128.

62

Id. at 128-129.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 136-137.

-28-

_____________________
Who Are The Good Guys?
J. Breinholt Aug. 2005

another historical twist. Richard Nixon appeared as a witness.
Although he was not asked whether he had authorized the Weather Underground breakins, Nixon’s testimony appeared to side with Felt, the anonymous source who, unbeknownst to
him, had done so much to drive him from office. The former President claimed that he had
authority to order the burglaries if national security was threatened, and that he had delegated
that authority to the FBI Director. According to Nixon, a presidential authorization Ameant
what would otherwise be unlawful or illegal becomes legal.@ Like Felt, Nixon was defiant. As
he uttered these words on the witness stand, Nixon pounded his finger on the wooden bench in
front of him.65
A few days later, on November 6, 1980, Felt and Miller were found guilty. Almost
immediately, Bob Woodward=s employer published an editorial expressing glee, describing the
conviction as a landmark case that will deter future policemen from overreaching their legal
authority. Felt bitterly told Woodward that Richard Nixon had done more to assist him than
the newspaper ever had.66 When President Reagan pardoned Felt and Miller several months
later, as if they were old friends, Nixon – ironically - sent Felt a bottle of Champaign with the
note AJustice ultimately prevails.@67
C.

The Eccentric Hooverite

This strange series of events casts doubt on the more benevolent of the theories
discussed above, like Acivil libertarian@ and the Aapolitical cop.@ If Felt=s motives were so pure,
why did he not come forward and take advantage of the fact that he disapproved of the
Watergate horrors so much that he took a role in disclosing them, when he himself was accused
of committing constitutional violations? If Felt was proud of his role in exposing the Nixon
Administration abuses, would he not have been more inclined to try to burnish his image as a
civil libertarian by publicly revealing his identity? Surely, that would put his accusers in place.
The fact that he did not suggests that, in his own heart, Felt did not view himself as a hero, and
that his motivations might have been less principled.
Following the Deep Throat announcement but prior to the publication of The Secret
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Man, I posed this question to several people, including a former Deputy Attorney General from
that era, a former FBI Director, and a private lawyer who was involved in the Gray/Felt/Miller
defense. Their answers varied. Perhaps Felt knew that this would not help him with his
immediate legal troubles. Maybe he was never truly worried that he would be sent to prison,
knowing that a pardon was inevitable in the event of a conviction, and he could therefore afford
not to play that card. I initially doubted these possibilities.
In The Secret Man, Woodward considers the question whether Felt=s revealing his
identity would have assisted his legal defense:
For some time, I had a fantasy that I could convince Felt to let me tell the full
story of his role as Deep Throat. Many people, perhaps most people, would see
him as a hero. He could explain what he had done and why. Public opinion
might be with him. I even had the idea that I could testify at his trial as a
character witness, showing up dramatically, taking the oath and laying out his
willingness to blow the whistle on Nixon, the Justice Department, Gray and
others.68
Woodward ultimately concludes that Felt=s unwillingness to disclose their secret
reflected a cool assessment of the legal trouble he was in, and how he badly needed to preserve
his law enforcement ties at the time.69 I was not convinced, in part because I wanted to think
that whoever Deep Throat was, he should have been proud of his legacy. For years, I and
others wanted to believe the best about this person. I also did not like to think that the men and
women of law enforcement - of which I am one - would not have failed to embrace Felt as a
hero. Felt must have made a mistake in not taking advantage of his role as Deep Throat.
Instead of getting Bob Woodward as a witness, he was stuck with Richard Nixon, and the jury
convicted him.
The problem is that Felt was absolutely right. Revealing himself as Deep Throat would
not have softened the attitude of his law enforcement accusers. We now know that for certain.
Granted, Felt might have benefited from a favorable public reaction, but this would not have
prevented his trial going forward, nor would it have likely changed the judgment of the
sequestered jury. If anything, revealing himself as Woodward=s source may have eliminated his
chances of a pardon by the incoming Republican president. Felt probably played his cards
right.
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So we are left speculating about his true motives.
Without knowing it, Woodward=s The Secret Man contains details about Felt=s
personality that suggest a theory that may better explain his motives, one that bridges the
theories discussed above. Is it possible that Felt had become, over time, a replica of his hero,
and who we now know had some rather eccentric views about how people should behave?
Was his decision to become Deep Throat a response to the behavior of people who did not act
in accordance with these eccentric views, to individuals whose manners he simply did not like?
J. Edgar Hoover, it can be said, valued rectitude, and despised slothfulness and softheadedness, and he was a stickler for appearance. Mark Felt might have lashed out against the
Nixon White House because he thought they were slothful B that is, they were tacky, unHoover-like. Perhaps it was nothing more profound than that.
The Secret Man offers support for this theory, although Woodward does not seize on it
as an explanation. Consider Woodward=s description of Felt=s infatuation with Hoover:
Somewhat to my astonishment, I felt that Felt was an admirer of J. Edgar
Hoover. He appreciated the orderliness of Hoover, who ran the Bureau with
rigid procedures and an iron fist. Hoover was always well dressed, fresh and
directly. Felt said he appreciated that Hoover arrived at the office at 6:30 each
morning and that everyone knew what was expected. The Nixon White House
was another matter.70
Felt himself described Hoover as being intolerant of typographical errors in documents, and his
insistence that FBI correspondence be answered within 24 hours and every incoming phone call
be answered by the third ring.71
Contrast this with how Felt reacted to Richard Nixon, on one of the few occasions he
dealt with him directly. On May 15, 1972, during the 1972 Presidential Primaries, Democratic
candidate George Wallace was shot at a Laurel, Maryland shopping mall. The shooter, Arthur
Bremer, was immediately arrested. That evening, because Gray was out of town, Nixon called
Felt at home to get an update on the incident. Bremer had apparently been injured in the melee,
and was in the hospital. According to Felt=s book, he was offended by Nixon=s reaction and to
his language:
AWell, it=s too bad they didn’t really rough up the son of a bitch,@ the President
said.
70

Id. at 33.

71

Id. at 42.

-31-

_____________________
Who Are The Good Guys?
J. Breinholt Aug. 2005

This was a rather rude and ill-mannered statement, and Felt did not like it.72 Chances
are, Hoover - certainly a man of strong opinions - would not have said such a thing to a virtual
stranger. That would have been sloppy.
Next, consider Felt=s reactions to Patrick Gray. He did not like the fact that Gray was
often out of town visiting field offices, or in the gym exercising, where he would not permit
intrusions.73 On his trips to the field, Gray insisted on using expensive military aircraft, the
cost of which had to be reimbursed out of the FBI=s budget. To Felt=s chagrin, Gray installed a
private kitchen near his office and a $10,000-a-year chef. The immediate effect of the kitchen
and the gourmet meals was a cooking smell that filled the public corridor.74 Gray was stinking
up the FBI hallways!
After Gray resigned from the FBI in disgrace (based in part on Felt=s actions), Felt also
seemed to have a visceral reaction to the next FBI Director, William Ruckelshaus. In his book,
Felt describes himself as Ajarred by the sight of Ruckelshaus lolling in an easy chair with his
feet on what I still felt was J. Edgar Hoover=s desk.@75 The examples continue. Felt hated the
youngsters at the White House like John Dean who were trying to commandeer the FBI for
their own purposes.76 In The FBI Pyramid, Felt complains about the manners and
professionalism of the young FBI agents who interviewed him as part of the leak investigation
themselves, rather than following protocol of having the current FBI Director do the job.77
If Felt was motivated by his distaste for tackiness, it is easy to see why he would be
impressed by the young Bob Woodward. The first time Felt met him, the future reporter was in
his Navy uniform, sitting outside the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House.78
Pictures of the Washington Post staff from the a few years later show Woodward to have
remained relatively well groomed and conservative in his appearance, particularly when
compared to Carl Bernstein. In All the President=s Men, Woodward revealed himself to be a
Republican.
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If we take this theory and follow it, more pieces of the puzzle fall into place.
Woodward, for example, describes Felt=s actions the first time he called him after the
publication of All the President=s Men. Felt wasted no time, hanging up on his friend. To this
day, Woodward Acan still hear the bang of his telephone and the sudden dial tone. Hanging up
was worse than any words he might have uttered.@79
Why this reaction? Much of the detail Felt provided Woodward had already been
published in the Washington Post=s Watergate coverage. For Felt, perhaps it was the shock at
having specific information attributed to a particular, singular source in one volume. Or could
it be that he was simply offended by the moniker that emerged from the book? ADeep Throat@
was the title of a popular pornographic movie of the time. The irreverent name was coined by
Howard Simons, the Post=s managing editor at the time.80 J. Edgar Hoover, with all of his
hang-ups, certainly would have been offended by someone calling him that. After all, Felt
attributed Hoover animosity towards Martin Luther King Jr. to the reverend=s sexual
peccadilloes.81 When asked point-blank by a Wall Street Journal reported whether he was Deep
Throat, Felt responded, AI=m not that kind of person.@
This theory, which can never be proven, would account some of the weaknesses of the
other four theories described above, and explain some of the mystery identified by Woodward:
how could Felt could square Nixon=s break-ins with his own actions?82 Without knowing it,
Woodward comes close to attaching himself to the Aeccentric Hooverite@ theory:
AI=m just not that kind of person.@ Did he know who he was? Did I? His
denials seemed to be embedded in the identity he had fashioned for himself. He
was like a witness who had told his story a dozen or a hundred times. He had to
stick to it, and over the years, perhaps he had even come to believe it.83
ARunning off to a parking garage to talk to me at 2 A.M.@ Woodward explains, would subject
Felt to the charge Athat he was out of control, a freelancer, inclined to take things into his own
hands for a larger purpose that he, and he alone, defined. He seemed to fear that he would be

79

Id. at 116.

80

Id. at 4.

81

Id. at 43.

82

Id. at 136.

83

Id. at 137-138.

-33-

_____________________
Who Are The Good Guys?
J. Breinholt Aug. 2005

considered a snitch, a rat.@84 This was tacky. It was something J. Edgar Hoover, who was
known to use the term Arat@ to describe public enemies and Communists, would have abhorred.
Maybe Felt had so absorbed the personal habits of Hoover, pushed so aggressively by
the Old Man on his subordinates, that, when Hoover died, Felt found himself rudderless and
reeling and had to react to the Watergate abuses the way he did. Maybe he did the right things,
but for the wrong reasons. He then came to regret the manner in which he operated, and even
the dirty name that was attached to his role. Of course, we will never know. Felt is still alive,
but he has no recollection.
D.

The Last Odd Twist

How can we be so certain that a decision by Felt to reveal his identity as Deep Throat
would not have helped him defend himself when he found himself under indictment by the
Carter Justice Department? The answer comes, once again, from a combination of the
published case law and The Secret Man.
The criminal case against Patrick Gray was severed from the Felt and Miller
prosecution. Thereafter, Gray=s lawyers, led by former federal prosecutor Alan Baron,
managed to get the entire case against him dismissed. However, Gray was not yet done.
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On April 9, 1981, Gray filed a lawsuit against his former accusers in the government,
seeking money damages for injury to his personal and professional reputation, extreme
emotional distress and mental anguish, and associated physical ailments. The complaint
alleged that the defendants violated Gray's Fifth Amendment rights to due process and to an
informed and impartial Grand Jury by conducting a grossly negligent pre-indictment
investigation and, as a result, failing to present exculpatory evidence and presenting false and
misleading evidence to the Grand Jury. About a dozen Department of Justice officials were
named in the lawsuit.85 This is yet another bizarre twist in the Deep Throat saga.
One of the civil defendants was J. Stanley Pottinger, Director of the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division. Remember, the Gray/Felt/Miller prosecution relied on the
civil rights criminal statute, the enforcement of which fell to Pottinger.86 Pottinger was one of
the Justice Department officials involved in the prosecution.
From Woodward=s book, we now know that Stanley Pottinger knew that Mark Felt was
Deep Throat before Felt was indicted. Would Felt=s disclosure have helped him? It turns out
that Pottinger, who had a role in the decision to seek the criminal charges, apparently knew
Felt=s secret before he approved the indictment.
Woodward and Pottinger knew each other. Pottinger was less concerned than Felt
about being seen in public with Woodward. They did not have to meet in secret in
underground parking garages. In 1976, while Pottinger was a senior Justice Department
official, Woodward met him for lunch in a restaurant. Pottinger proceeded to violate the rules
relating to grand jury secrecy by telling Woodward that he had uncovered Deep Throat.
Pottinger had questioned Felt before the grand jury, asking him whether Nixon had ever
pressed the FBI to conduct black-bag jobs. Felt said no, but smiled slightly and said that there
was some speculation that he was Deep Throat. Unexpectedly for Felt, a grand juror raised his
hand and asked, AWere you?@
AWas I what?@ inquired Felt
AWere you Deep Throat?@
Felt was caught off guard. He turned white, and said no. Apparently feeling sorry for
Felt, the prosecutor told the stenographer to stop taking notes. Pottinger walked over to Felt,
and whispered to him that he was still under oath, but that he considered the question to be out
of bounds. He said he would be willing to officially withdraw the question, and asked for his
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preference.
AWithdraw the question,@ a flushed Felt immediately responded.
As he told this story to Woodward, Pottinger smiled. Obviously, he was in on the
secret. He promised not to disclose this to anyone, and apparently fulfilled his commitment,
even though he had violated grand jury secrecy in his discussion with Woodward.87
So one of Felt=s prosecutors knew Felt was Deep Throat, and the indictment nonetheless
followed. That probably puts to rest any claim that Felt=s disclosure of his role in publicizing
the Nixon abuses would have softened the prosecutors= attitude towards him to not pursue the
criminal case.
Or does it? It is possible that Pottinger argued against Felt=s indictment for this very
reason, but lost the internal battle. I am familiar with how this can happen, and Pottinger=s
name would have still appeared on the charges. This possibility is doubtful, because a case
such as this could not likely have gone forward without the acquiescence of the chief of the
Civil Rights Division. Pottinger=s opinion of the case would have carried too much weight for
it to go forward over his objection. Perhaps Pottinger was against the case but hid this fact
from his colleagues, because he did not want to reveal that Mark Felt was Deep Throat. Of
course, this would have been an abrogation of his responsibility as a Justice lawyer, not to
mention his role as a team player . Perhaps Pottinger thought that the Felt prosecution was
righteous, that the process of the trial would force Felt to reveal himself as Deep Throat so
Pottinger would not have to. Still, it is hard to fathom a prosecutor who knows Mark Felt=s
secret allowing a prosecution for the same conduct on which the defendant blew the whistle.
Moreover, for Pottinger, there is this tough legal question: if he had concluded that Mark Felt
was Deep Throat in 1976, as Woodward now claims, did he not have an obligation to bring this
information to the attention of Felt=s attorney because it may have been exculpatory? In
leaking grand jury information to Bob Woodward over lunch, did Stanley Pottinger not become
Deep Throat II? We know that Felt confirmed the existence of information in FBI files to
Woodward, but no one has yet suggested that he disclosed matters that occurred before the
grand jury. Within law enforcement circles, that is a far more serious violation.
What do we know about Pottinger=s motives, and where is he today?
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We know from Woodward that Pottinger was a sufficiently dashing figure to be invited
to the Kennedy compound in Hyannisport, Massachusetts, as a guest of Ethel Kennedy, since
Woodward ran into him there in the summer of 1977.88 By that time, Woodward himself was a
celebrity, having been portrayed in the movie All the President=s Men by Robert Redford. This
past year, Woodward spoke to Pottinger, who described himself as supportive of the right of
reporters to maintain confidential sources and favorably disposed to Felt=s decision to provide
information to Woodward. Of course, this should be expected. Pottinger had leaked grand jury
information to Woodward 28 years earlier.
This attitude is consistent with Pottinger=s current station. He was a rising star in legal
circles, a 34-year old Justice Department appointee who - along with Bill Clinton and Dan
Rather - actually made Time magazine=s 1974 list of 200 "Future Leaders of America."89 He
argued four cases before the Supreme Court. He left law to try his had at investment banking.
In the 1980s, he went to film school, while serving as a trustee for the Lawyer=s Committee on
Civil Rights. He was romantically linked to Gloria Steinem. Pottinger ultimately decided to
try his hand at writing fiction. He has been successful at it, publishing several well-received
novels that focus on the hunt for Nazis, biological warfare, and abortion.90 Asked why he left a
high-powered law practice, Pottinger says AWe all have to zig and zag to find out where we
ultimately want to go.@91
V.

Conclusion: Who Are The Good Guys?

Like many Watergate aficionados, I want to believe that Deep Throat was motivated by
high principles and patriotism. His actions enriched our lives. It is hard not to cheer for him,
when one realizes the role he played in exposing clear government abuses.
The problem for me is that I am on record in lauding the Justice Department's actions
against rogue FBI officials who ignored the legal regime that allows us to rebut the claims of
the critics of the USA PATRIOT Act. Today, it is important that we be able to say that there is
no such thing as a legal warrantless wiretap. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA),92 an example of positive post-Watergate reform, is the sole basis for conducting certain
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types of intrusive surveillance when focused on national security threats within the United
States. If this reform means anything, we must be willing to punish government officials who
cavalierly ignore it, no matter how pure their motives.
Perhaps we can think the best about Mark Felt if we treat his conduct as occurring at a
time when the rules were not so clear. After all, FISA was not enacted until 1978. Like those
of us involved in counterterrorism today, perhaps history should judge Mark Felt by his
motives, rather than whether he occasionally stepped over the line. The problem with this
notion is that it seems like a rationalization. The rule of law matters for law enforcers. It is not
enough to be properly motivated. We must operate legally, lest we plunge into the abyss. We
cannot pick and choose which laws we want to follow. We should not tolerate such a wide
margin of error by our counterterrorism enforcers. Then again, indicting them may be too
much. The fact that law enforcers are occasionally indicted for their official conduct may be
part of the reason we are not more creative in our terrorism disruption efforts, not willing be as
aggressive as the American people (and blue ribbon commissions) want us to be after they
come face to face with an actual terrorist attack. More rationalization.
The fact remains that Mark Felt did not operate legally. Judging his historical legacy,
we might be willing to cut him some slack, and accept that his effectiveness as a cop depended
on virtual blind reverence to a system of acceptable practices that built the great American
federal police force, no matter how eccentric. That might make his pardon, as Richard Nixon
described it, a true example of justice prevailing. It is hard not to agree with President
Reagan=s words when he issued the unconditional pardon:
America was at war in 1972, and Messrs Felt and Miller followed procedures
they believed essential to keep the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General,
and the President of the United States advised of the activities of hostile foreign
powers and their collaborators in this country ... America was generous to those
who refused to serve their country in the Vietnam War. We can be no less
generous to two men who acted on high principles to bring an end to the
terrorism that was threatening our Nation.93
Still, Mark Felt, like all of us, will have to be judged by the sweep of history, with all of
its bizarre twists. The same is true of Richard Nixon, Bob Woodward, Patrick Gray, even Stan
Pottinger, and other characters who make The Secret Man such a remarkable book, and
Watergate such a fascinating story. This is the price we pay as a society if we believe that
history is relevant. It has to be, for anything less is beneath us. The secret of Deep Throat is
over. The historical arguments continue.
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Here is my argument.
Those of us in law enforcement are proud of the tradition that requires us to be driven
by facts, rather than by political power, what is sometimes referred to today as “juice.” We
occasionally make high-powered enemies. In the ideal world, there is a system that protects us.
What creates this tradition? It is from those who have come before us who, by their example,
give us the daily comfort to stay in this game. Somehow, we find our way to go on.
Mark Felt's decision to cooperate with Bob Woodward might well have been driven by
this type of dynamic. He was an FBI special agent, and one of the truly successfully ones, so
much so that eventually ascending to the position of FBI Director was a distinct possibility. He
knew the agency, its traditions and its secrets. Like Hoover, he was neat and rigid in habit,
because that it is what got you promoted. Like with Hoover, the FBI was Mark Felt’s life.
Suddenly, Hoover is gone. Felt’s life is thrown into disarray, at a time when some
unscrupulous people within our government are trying to take advantage of the leadership void
and manipulate it for their own purposes.
If you are Mark Felt, as has been said so many times since the Deep Throat revelation,
where do you turn? There are no friendly prosecutors, at least not initially. They all report to
the Attorney General, and ultimately to the President. Congress? Not a place a Hooverite is
likely to turn for help. What about the clean-cut kid from the Washington Post who he met in
such a confused state a couple of years ago, the one who is on this story now?
Felt’s entire career had been based on prosecution of bad guys. Suddenly, he finds, in the
twilight of his career, that the bad guys are in charge. This circumstance threatens the very
essence of his life up to that point. Where does he go? How about that impressive young man
now who is now a reporter, who looks like the type that will not cause too much damage and
may be useful. The scenario starts to come together.
The unfortunate fact was that, for at least a brief period, Felt might have become a bad
guy himself, at least one who was willing to cut corners, when it comes to his relations with the
media and with the way he conducted certain very important investigations where lives may
have been at stake. He was pardoned, but the law books still contain descriptions of his
misdeeds, and he is referred to by people like me as an example of how the system works and
how the government can be trusted to police their own bad elements. There is also now a clear
split within law enforcement ranks whether Mark Felt should be considered a hero.94
This is what I mean about shaking my attitude about what it means to be a public
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servant. I now believe that Mark Felt embodied some of the best traits of career professionals,
and that it was some of those traits that led him to become Deep Throat. However, his real
motives were more base, and even aesthetic - perhaps petty - in nature. Like J. Edgar Hoover,
Felt was offended by the personal attributes of those individuals with whom he had to deal, and
it was this tendency that drove him to do what he did. He was not trying to save the Republic.
He was trying to punish obnoxious people. What he did may have been good, but he most
likely did it for the wrong reasons.
The again, I may be proven wrong by history. Stay tuned.
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